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ANALOGY AND METAPHORIC PROCESS 
ROBERT MASSON 
[The author argues that the dispute between Elizabeth Johnson and 
Joseph Bracken about the doctrine of God is rooted in a disagree-
ment about how we know and speak of God. The difference is 
characterized as a choice between one view that sees theology's task 
as finding appropriate analogies for conceiving God and another 
view governed by the assumption that a more fundamental meta-
phoric shift in thinking and speaking is required. This article clari-
fies what is at issue by analyzing other conceptions of analogy in the 
light of a specific theory of metaphoric process.] 
THE FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT in a conversation is not always the apparent one, especially if it entails negotiating differences between 
metaphysical or theological perspectives. The nature of divine providence 
appears to be the point at issue in the conversation between Elizabeth 
Johnson1 and Joseph Bracken2 in articles published in Theological Studies 
(1996) as well as in subsequent discussions.3 Does process theology or a 
contemporary revision of Thomism provide a better paradigm for elabo-
rating the doctrine and for responding to questions raised by the contem-
porary scientific worldview? My contention here is that a more fundamen-
tal issue is at the root of their disagreement: how do we know and speak of 
God at all? Their arguments presuppose fundamentally different answers. 
ROBERT MASSON is associate professor of theology at Marquette University. He 
received his Ph.D. at Fordham University. In addition to his research into the 
theology of Karl Rahner (editing also the annual "Rahner Papers" for the journal 
Philosophy and Theology), he studies especially the function of religious language 
and knowledge in our theoretical, doctrinal, and practical understanding of God, 
Christ, and theological anthropology. 
1
 Elizabeth A. Johnson, "Does God Play Dice? Divine Providence and Chance," 
Theological Studies 57 (1996) 3-18. 
2
 Joseph A. Bracken, "Response to Elizabeth Johnson's 'Does God Play Dice?' " 
Theological Studies 57 (1996) 720-30. 
3
 See Nancy A. Dallavalle, "Trinitarian Theology" and William R. Stoeger, 
"Theology and the Natural Sciences" Catholic Theological Society of America, 
Proceedings 53 (1998) 130-31, and 135-36. See also Bracken's subsequent essay, 
"The Theology of God of Elizabeth A. Johnson," in Things New and Old: Essays 
on the Theology of Elizabeth A. Johnson, ed. Phyllis Zagano and Terrence W. 
Tilley (New York: Crossroad, 1999) 21-38; and Johnson's response, "Forging The-
ology: A Conversation with Colleagues," in Things New and Old 91-123. 
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Hence, Bracken's critique does not effectively engage Johnson's position. 
This failure of engagement demonstrates why attention to the metaphoric 
character of language and thinking about God is crucial to understanding 
the logic of religious signification and is crucial to the dialogue between 
theology and science. 
A CHOICE BETWEEN TWO WORLD VIEWS 
At the CTSA discussion, Bracken summarized the differences between 
their positions as "a choice between two world views, with one worldview 
basically governed by the logic of objective cause-effect relationships and 
the other ruled by.. .the logic of intersubjectivity."4 His "quarrel is not with 
Johnson's conclusions but with the metaphysical conceptuality she uses to 
get there."5 Johnson responded that Bracken was objecting to an "ahis-
torical 'Cajetan' reading" of Thomism rather than the interpretation she 
espouses that appeals to Aquinas's analogical use of being as "a 'limit 
concept,' not a noun."6 Bracken was not persuaded that this line of re-
sponse addresses the logical flaw that he believes is entailed in Thomism.7 
I believe he resists because their disagreement is rooted in a more funda-
mental decision about how religious and metaphysical concepts signify. 
Insofar as their choices are indeed between two world views, it should not 
be surprising to find each describing the alternatives differently and even 
proposing interpretations of each other's positions that, despite obvious 
good will, might appear from the other's perspective to be misreadings. 
What to call these two world views or how to describe them, therefore, 
is itself a point of contention. Johnson's retrieval of Thomism and Brack-
en's adaptation of Whitehead ultimately share a common philosophical 
heritage and use similar terms, understood, however, in significantly, but 
also sometimes subtly, different ways. That, I suspect, is why Bracken 
never directly responds to Johnson's explanation that she uses "being" 
analogically as a "limit concept," or why Johnson might view as non-
responsive his appeals to: the doctrine of analogy, Ian Barbour's notion of 
models, or the need for metaphysical rigor in the face of a trend toward 
overemphasis on God's incomprehensibility. Hence, although there are 
designations for these two world views ready to hand, they too would be 
highly contestable. That would be the difficulty with simply appropriating 
Rahner's distinction between the ontic and ontological to describe the 
difference between Bracken's and Johnson's conceptualizations of God; so 
4
 Dallavalle, "Trinitarian Theology" 130. 
5
 Johnson, "Response to Elizabeth Johnson's 'Does God Play Dice?' " 730. 
6
 Dallavalle, "Trinitarian Theology" 130. 
7
 Ibid. 131. 
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too with Heidegger's differentiation between the logic of metaphysics (or 
onto-theology) and the logic of the holy (or the e-vent of truth); or with 
Thomas Sheehan's further refinement of these as a contrast between ou-
siological and kinetic thinking.8 Each gets at something of the difference in 
question. But each carries freight of its own and, in any case, Bracken could 
object that such distinctions are in fact accounted for more adequately in 
process theology's affirmation that "being is an activity rather than an 
entity."9 Hence I shall propose my own designation for the two world views 
at the root of their disagreement and, in what follows, assume the burden 
of explaining the choice and offering something of a justification for it. In 
this, I am guilty of using their exchange as a pretext for making a point 
about how knowledge and language signify God, just as Bracken's critique 
of Johnson's article was in fact something of a pretext for advancing his 
proposal for a Whiteheadian notion of intersubjectivity as a model for 
conceptualizing God. 
Classical Theism: A Red Herring 
If ground is to be cleared for a more fundamental engagement between 
these two world views, it is important not to get caught up too quickly in 
process theology's confrontation with "classical theism." I hope in the 
argument that follows to demonstrate that Bracken's critique of Thomism 
is something of a red herring. In the meantime, three reasons can be 
suggested for waiting until later to engage directly the issue as he has 
framed it. First, although Bracken is attentive to Johnson's claims and 
language, at a number of key junctures he assumes common philosophical 
meanings within his discourse and her's without first establishing that they 
are actually talking about the same matters. I argue that this is clearly an 
issue with the doctrine of analogy and the conception of being, and that as 
a matter of fact Johnson and Bracken mean very different things when they 
use these terms. 
Second, Bracken ties much of his case to his characterization of the logic 
of Thomism and the contention that Johnson cannot avoid certain mis-
taken entailments of that logic. He follows a line of argumentation typical 
for process thinkers. Justification for their arguments gets tied up with a 
critique of "classical theism." Proving the inadequacies of the other posi-
tion becomes ingredient to supporting their own, and vice versa, supporting 
8
 Thomas Sheehan, Karl Rahner: The Philosophical Foundations (Athens: Ohio 
University, 1987). 
9
 Joseph A. Bracken, The Divine Matrix: Creativity as Link between East and 
West (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1995) 37. See also the most recent articulation of his 
position in The One in the Many: A Contemporary Reconstruction of the God-World 
Relationship (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001). 
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the other position is taken as a challenge to process theology's viability. 
Tying exposition and criticism so closely makes initial assessment of either 
position on its own merits more complicated and difficult than needs to be. 
Anyone who is sympathetic to Johnson's position and who judges Brack­
en's attribution of "classical theistic" maneuvers to be inaccurate or forced 
is likely to be left with an impression that his critique is at best a misun­
derstanding, or at worst a misrepresentation. Moreover, as David Burrell 
argued in this journal some time ago, linking the justification for process 
theology to its critiques of "classical theism" makes its own case more 
vulnerable since then a failure on any of these counts undermines the 
position as such.10 
A third reason to avoid getting caught up in the debate about "classical 
theism" is suggested by a lesson that might be taken from Bracken's own 
work. His creative modifications of process thought have shown resources 
within that tradition for at least addressing limitations that, according to 
critics like Burrell, are inherent in the logic of the position (for example, 
whether process thought can provide for an account of anything like the 
Christian doctrine of the Trinity or a personal God). 1 1 Should not Bracken 
allow for the possibility that others might have effected analogous modi­
fications of Thomism? Better to aim at a genuinely mutual engagement 
before committing to incommensurable counter positions. 
ANALOGIES AND THE ANALOGY OF BEING 
Equivocation on fundamental conceptions poses a significant obstacle 
for such engagement. This appears to be the situation when Bracken and 
Johnson appeal to the analogous character of assertions about God. They 
have different conceptions in mind. Bracken insists that "the principle of 
analogy, after all, requires that the entities under comparison have some­
thing in common as well as fundamental differences. Otherwise analogy 
turns out to be equivocation; the same term, 'being,' then has totally dif­
ferent meanings when applied to God and creatures."1 2 For this reason, he 
1 0
 David Burrell, "Does Process Theology Rest on a Mistake7" Theological Stud­
ies 43 (1982) 125-35 
1 1
 In addition to Bracken's The Divine Matrix, see his Society and Spirit A 
Trinitarian Cosmology (Cranbury, Ν J : Susquehanna University, 1991) and "Sub­
sistent Relation. Mediating Concept for a New Synthesis7" Journal of Religion 64 
(1984) 188-204. 
1 2
 Bracken, "Response to Elizabeth Johnson's 'Does God Play Dice?' " 721 
Bracken is equally emphatic m the latter essay* "Secondly, I would argue that the 
classical doctrine of analogy to which Johnson makes appeal in this case still has to 
employ terms that somehow apply to God as well as to creatures" ("The Theology 
of God of Elizabeth A Johnson" 25). 
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objects to Johnson's assertion, "It is not as if God and creatures stood as 
uncreated and created instantiations of 'being' which is held in common by 
both (a frequent misunderstanding)."13 Bracken wonders why "the as-
sumption that God and creatures share the reality of being is 'a frequent 
misunderstanding'." Although he would grant that "God is the primary 
instantiation of being, the only entity that possesses being by nature," he 
asks "why cannot creatures participate in the same act of being, albeit in a 
finite way?"14 The issue to notice here, is not Bracken's suggestion that 
Johnson equivocates in her use of the term "being," but his assumptions 
about what constitutes equivocation and what makes for a legitimate anal-
ogy-
David Burrell 
It is telling that at this step in his argument, Bracken refers to David 
Burrell's study on Aquinas.15 While noting that Burrell "points out, the 
way being is predicated of God cannot be understood from the way in 
which being is predicated of creatures," Bracken detects a contradiction 
because Burrell "likewise points out that that which is thereby signified, 
namely being, applies literally to God as well as to creatures."16 First, 
Bracken's paraphrase is inaccurate on two counts. As I read Burrell on 
those pages, he says that esse applies analogically to God and to creatures. 
It applies literally (or properly) only to God. Moreover, it is clear from the 
context that Bracken identifies "literal" and "univocal," whereas Burrell 
most certainly does not.17 More importantly, however, calling attention to 
this apparent incongruity, without noting its context in the book's argu-
ment, and indeed in the research program of Burrell's career, misses the 
key issue. To make out what Aquinas affirms of God, it is essential first to 
grasp how Aquinas is using language. This is the volume's principal aim. 
Burrell makes a compelling case, here and in his other works,18 that al-
13
 Johnson, "Does God Play Dice" 11. 
14
 Bracken, "Response to Elizabeth Johnson's 'Does God Play Dice?' " 721. 
15
 David Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame, 1979). 
16
 Bracken, "Response to Elizabeth Johnson's 'Does God Play Dice?' " 721, n. 6. 
17
 "Some students of Aquinas may have gathered from his use of esse that at least 
this expression offers a univocal access to God . . . . However proper the formula 'to 
be God is to be to-be' may be, it does not offer us univocal access to God. And the 
reason is clear: esse is not a univocal expression in spite of its substantive form. In 
fact, the grammar of the term diverges so startlingly from substantives generally 
that it can hardly be called an expression at all. So it would prove chimerical to look 
to esse to provide a univocal baseline on which to peg one's use of analogous 
expressions" {Aquinas 57). 
18
 In addition to Aquinas, see his Analogy and the Philosophy of Language (New 
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though Aquinas appealed to the analogous character of language about 
God, he did not have a doctrine or theory of analogy as such. Attempts to 
derive an implicit and consistent one from his thought are not borne out in 
Aquinas's texts.19 Burrell contends, however, that careful scrutiny of the 
way Aquinas used language, particularly his masterful employment of the 
logical distinctions available within the medieval repertoire, discloses that 
he was putting language and these distinctions to a new and revolutionary 
use. Burrell's Aquinas was stretching language and grammar in a very 
precise and rigorous manner in order to make a point and to lead to an 
insight that could not be attained more directly. 
Burrell demonstrates this through a meticulous scrutiny of Aquinas's 
linguistic and logical moves, particularly in Question 3 of the Summa theo-
logiae. This "grammatical" analysis is dense, and the conception it wishes 
to elucidate is subtle. As Burrell admits, "grammar remains a thin gruel."20 
For our purposes, however, it is not essential to trace the whole argument 
or to establish its validity. It is enough to establish that Burrell understands 
analogy in an entirely different way than Bracken, and that Bracken's 
analysis does not engage this understanding—the essential thrust of which, 
I contend, is shared by Johnson and many other contemporary theologians 
inspired by Aquinas's achievement. 
Question 3 treats the simplicity of God. Burrell sees Aquinas asking 
whether God can be located semantically the way other realities can? Is 
God a body? Is God composed of matter and form? of substance and 
accidents? Is there any way in which he is composite or enters into com-
positeness with other things? Burrell traces how "in one article after an-
other, Aquinas monitors each possible way to get hold of something: lo-
cating an object in space and time or saying anything about it." The upshot, 
Burrell claims, is that "God escapes our grasp on every count."21 In the 
case of every other reality (whether physical, mental, real, or imaginary), 
one can locate the thing and speak about it as a composite of matter and 
form, accidents and substance, potency and act, genus and species, or form 
and esse. The point of Aquinas's discussion is to show that God transcends 
this sort of description. If God is the sort of reality Christians believe God 
to be, that is to say, if God is the beginning and end of all things, then 
logically and grammatically God does not fit into any of these categories. 
But since such categories are the only tools available in our language and 
grammar for talking about realities, God included, asserting God's reality 
Haven: Yale University, 1973); Exercises in Religious Understanding (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame, 1974); Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Mai-
monides, Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1986). 
19
 See particularly, Burrell, Aquinas 55-58. 
20
 Ibid. 115. 21 Ibid. 18-19. 
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requires purposefully breaking the rules in a way that indirectly displays 
what cannot be directly described. Burrell urges us to watch Aquinas's 
linguistic "performance," that is to say, how he uses language and how 
language works, when he affirms "God is simple." This affirmation does 
not describe a feature or characteristic of God that we can directly grasp or 
comprehend. It does not enable us to fit God into the categories used to 
speak of every other reality. "Simplicity" does not designate a description, 
like hardness, height or color. "Simplicity" designates what Burrell calls a 
"logical" or "grammatical" distinction. Even though the term "simplicity" 
is a substantive and thus sounds like a quality or description of God, 
Aquinas uses the term as shorthand for denying that any substantives, at 
least as we know them, can apply to God without the significant qualifi-
cation just made. If God is the beginning and end of all things, then God 
cannot be like other things and the grammar we use to speak of God 
cannot operate the way that it operates when we talk about such entities. 
How then can one think of God at all or affirm anything of God without, 
as Bracken suggests, equivocating? Much of Burrell's analysis is devoted to 
teasing out the logic and transcendental grounds for such signification 
implicit in Aquinas's grammatical maneuvers. Underlying it all is Aquinas's 
insight into the real distinction between essence and existence, and the 
consequent recognition of esse as a distinct ontological category. Burrell 
argues that grammatically the insight amounts to the distinction that must 
be made between asserting that something is the case, and entertaining a 
proposition about something being the case. When we say that something 
is, that it exists, we are not describing any particular feature of the reality. 
"Exist" is not a predicate or mode of being that characterizes a thing or 
defines what it is. For example, formally the definition or nature of a 
"walking dog," is the same whether I am simply entertaining the proposi-
tion, "The dog is walking" (as I read it in a novel or conceive a hypothetical 
situation) or if I am asserting this of the dog that had been sitting by my 
desk. "The dog is walking" has the same meaning (traveling on foot at a 
pace slower than a run) in either case although what I intend to commu-
nicate in the two cases is significantly different. We are doing something 
quite different when we assert that "the dog beside me is walking," than 
when we merely entertain the idea of the dog walking. Burrell observes 
that "a proposition asserted looks just like one that is being considered," 
but he notes that the "act of asserting it has no structural counterpart" in 
our language or grammar. Yet it is this act of asserting, he concludes, that 
provides the proper analogue for our saying of any entity that it exists or 
that it has existence.22 
So grammatically speaking, when I say that something exists or that it 
Ibid. 34. 
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has existence, this is not predication in the normal sense (the attribution of 
some feature or quality to the dog) even though it looks that way if we only 
attend to the "surface grammar [of exist] and treat it like other predi-
cates."23 That is why, Burrell notes, "philosophical grammarians insist on 
calling it a pseudo-predicate" and why we have to be attentive to the 
differences in the grammar of "about" when we talk "about the dog's 
existing" or "about the dog walking." "About" does not work the same way 
in these two cases. The former is an instance of "asserting" that is a sui 
generis activity logically and grammatically distinct from the activity of 
predicating "walking" of the dog. When we predicate "walking" of the dog, 
we are able to specify the manner in which "walking is related to dogness. 
And so with all predication. But not so with ' . . . exists.' That is why we 
must be wary," Burrell warns, "in our use of ' about ' . . . . For precisely what 
we do not (and apparently cannot) know is 'the way in which a thing 
possesses its existence'."24 Note that Burrell is not denying that "this ac-
tivity asserts something about the thing itself."25 Rather he is noting the 
special character of this sort of assertion and that it is warranted by a 
grammatical analogue. 
This is preeminently the case when Aquinas affirmed that in God es-
sence and esse are identical. Burrell highlights the logically odd character 
of the affirmation by expressing the proposition without recourse to famil-
iar substantives: to be God is to be "to be." In affirming that God's essence 
is "to be," Aquinas is not giving us a description of God in the ordinary 
sense of things, because "to be" is not a thing or predicate in the ordinary 
sense. Rather the affirmation that God's nature is to be "to be" is an 
implication of the notion that "God is the beginning and end of all things." 
Burrell argues that this is a logical or grammatical implication, because it 
is not based on what we know of God or on some feature of God which we 
have grasped. Instead it is a shorthand for Aquinas's argument already 
noted above that if God is to be what Christians believe God to be, then 
God must be a reality that transcends all the ways by which we locate every 
other reality through predication in terms of form/matter, substance/ 
accidents, and so forth. This is a way of locating what is meant by God. It 
also models practically how to distinguish the logic of talking about God so 
conceived from the logic we use to talk of created things. But in itself the 
assertion does not prove God's existence or describe God's existence. Scru-
tinizing Aquinas's arguments underscores the extent of his affirmation that 
"we cannot know what God is, but only what he is not."26 "Aquinas is 
Ibid. 35. 24 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Summa theologiae I, q. 3, introduction, as cited in Burrell, Aquinas 13. 
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walking a tightrope here. While he must state that God's nature is to-be, 
that statement does not let us know what such a nature is like."27 
But although "exists" is a pseudo-predicate, there is enough of an anal-
ogy between the activity of asserting and the activity of predicating to 
warrant the use of esse as a predicate in this extended and analogous sense. 
Although what "to be" signifies cannot be grasped directly in a concept, the 
grammatical analogy between asserting things "to be" and affirming predi-
cates of things, enables us to stretch predication and to use substantives to 
talk of a thing's "being" or of God's "to be." In employing this structural 
analogy, however, "Aquinas does not reduce an existential assertion to a 
predicative one."28 Rather, he extends language to display and speak of 
what is beyond language's grasp. Aquinas's use of esse brings us to this 
linguistic impasse, as does our use of esse. "That is one accepted role of 
philosophical analysis: to display the limits of language not by pretending 
to have comprehended them, but rather by bringing one up against those 
limits hard enough to feel them."29 Hence Aquinas can call on Aristotle's 
distinction of the relation of potency to act in order to describe the relation 
of essence to esse as a justification for the claim that God's essence is to be 
"to be." What warrants the affirmation is not that creatures and creator 
share the same act of "being" as if with the term "being" we grasp some 
thing or common denominator between Creator and creatures. There is 
not, in this account, some core univocal meaning for "to be" as Bracken 
had argued must be the case. But there is something common in the activity 
of asserting which can license a very restricted and analogous, but never-
theless meaningful use of "to be" for locating God as "mystery" (in the 
proper sense of the term as a reality known but not comprehended) and for 
conceiving that "to be" as the beginning and ending of all things. This 
stretches the meaning of "analogous" itself so that it too is not a univocal 
concept—or, speaking circularly, analogy is itself an analogous concept. 
If one is mindful of this qualitatively different logic of signification, then 
it is possible on Burrell's reading to understand Aquinas's use of esse as a 
substantive (even "the emphatic substantive: ipsum esse"30) without 
thereby concluding that God is in anyway an "entity" within our grasp or 
that God's "act of being" must somehow be like our "being." This is 
possible because "being," just as terms of perfection has a range of mean-
ings that points beyond any of the particular instances we can know. For 
example, we can use "living," "good," or "wise" to express many ways of 
being alive, good, or wise without thereby exhausting the range of these 
terms to encompass still other ways of living, goodness, or wisdom not yet 
Burrell, Aquinas 42. 
Ibid. 46. 29 Ibid. 50. 
Ibid. 47. 
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known or envisioned.31 We can thus distinguish the thing signified {res 
significata), wisdom for example, from the manner in which it was signified 
{modus significandi) as a particular instantiation of wisdom. Burrell con-
tends that analogous terms such as these "have a capacity to function quite 
literally in diverse contexts." He explains, "For example, I can use 'in 
control' to describe the governance of a strict or of a permissive parent, 
employing that analogous term properly in each case. And I can recognize 
this situation, notwithstanding the fact that each of us tends to use the word 
by reference to certain paradigm situations."32 So the range of meaning is 
not circumscribed by some underlying univocal sense. Analogous terms 
just as "wisdom" are open to a range of meanings beyond those specified 
in the dictionary. Burrell maintains that "the single recurring fact is that we 
can always find a more comprehensive use of the term. In fact, a recursive 
formula displays the analogous structure of these expressions, e.g., the wise 
man is one who realizes he is not wise. And the formula has an inbuilt 
ratchet-effect. The more accomplished the wise man is, the wiser he be-
comes in realizing that his accomplishments do not constitute wisdom."33 
Burrell argues that reflection on this ratcheting-effect of such words "can 
intimate a literal sense which transcends our actual employment."34 And if 
God is the source of all perfection, then it follows that such terms apply 
most properly and literally (not univocally) only to God. We know such 
perfections only in the limited mode of signification available to our crea-
turely experience. We know instantiations of wisdom, not wisdom as such. 
We have an analogous rather than univocal grasp of what wisdom is. What 
wisdom is literally or properly, on this understanding, is beyond our grasp. 
However paradoxical this sounds, it is not equivocating. Our experience of 
the range of meaning for such a term and what Burrell describes as the 
ratcheting-effecting of its grammar, gives us an intimation of its literal 
sense even though it falls short of an intuition, direct grasp, or underlying 
univocal description. So although we affirm such perfections of God, we do 
so without knowing how they signify God. It is crucial to note, that "the 
proper use of appropriate expressions turns not on acquaintance with di-
vinity, but rather on a keen appreciation of the peculiar ways we must 
fracture logic to constitute a domain of discourse about God."35 The 
knowledge of God that results is certainly limited, particularly if analysis is 
restricted to strictly philosophical reflection without theological appeal to 
revelation. But it is nevertheless for all its indirectness real knowledge. 
And for all its roundaboutness it is grounded in our understanding of how 
things are. Burrell readily acknowledges that Aquinas did not work in so 
Ibid. 64. 32 Ibid. 63. 
Ibid. 70. 34 Ibid. 
Ibid. 65. 
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"highly reflective manner" as this. The interpretation presumes that "great 
thinkers like Aquinas do make genial moves, operating better than they 
know how to say."36 
The objective in rehearsing all this has not been to establish the correct-
ness of Burrell's interpretation of Aquinas, but only to show that it puts 
forth an understanding of analogous predication and of esse that is entirely 
different from what Bracken presumes. Burrell insists that it is critical we 
understand what sort of signification we are dealing with in analogies for 
God, and particularly that we get the logic of Aquinas's use of esse right. In 
Burrell's reading, Aquinas "hangs literally everything upon it."37 This is 
very instructive for getting at the difference between Johnson's and Brack-
en's understandings of religious and metaphysical signification, but we do 
not need to hang everything on Burrell's interpretation. Johnson's essay on 
providence presupposes her earlier analysis of the doctrine of analogy 
where she provided a lucid and succinct overview of the notion in 20th-
century theology featuring in particular the work of Rahner, Przywara, 
Hill, and Tracy.38 She concludes, "The net result of these various studies is 
an understanding of analogy in the Catholic mind today that once again 
stresses its movement through negation towards mystery, and consequently 
the nonliteral although still meaningful character of its speech about 
God."39 Some ambiguity could be avoided if she had said "non-univocal" 
instead of "nonliteral," but I agree with her conclusion about the "net 
result." Bracken's response to her theology suggests, however, that the 
common possession of this perspective in the Catholic mind today may be 
too sanguine. In that light, it bears emphasizing too how Rahner under-
stands the logic of analogy as qualitatively different from what Bracken 
envisions. 
Karl Rahner 
Rahner's theology is sufficiently familiar to the readers of this journal 
that it is not necessary to repeat the arguments that lead him to conclude 
that God is the mystery toward which human knowing and love implicitly 
and necessarily reach but who nevertheless always remains beyond human 
grasp even in that reaching. For Rahner, God cannot be conceived as an 
entity in the world or alongside it. Johnson notes in her essay that this leads 
Rahner to recover a more complex understanding of analogy. "Karl Rah-
ner refuses to understand analogy as a hybrid between univocity and equiv-
36
 Ibid. 53. 37 Ibid. 51. 
38
 Elizabeth Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological 
Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1992) 104-20. 
39
 Ibid. 111. 
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ocity; rather, he insists on the original nature of the analogical relationship 
that grounds subsequent speech. We exist analogously in and through be-
ing grounded in holy mystery which always surpasses us."40 
In light of Bracken's critique, it might be helpful to unpack this claim to 
show its general congruence with Burrell's position, for Rahner argues just 
as emphatically that language about God has a different logical status from 
language about other entities. Even to use the phrase "other entities" is 
misleading. "The ultimate measure cannot be measured."41 For, Rahner 
explains in language reminiscent of Burrell's, "since it is the condition of 
possibility for all categorized distinctions and divisions, it cannot itself be 
distinguished from other things by the same modes of distinction."42 Rah-
ner is not merely offering an apophatic reminder of God's transcendence. 
He insists: 
Analogy, therefore, has nothing to do with the notion of a secondary, inexact 
middle position between clear concepts and those which designate two completely 
different things with the same phonetic sound. 
Rather, because transcendental experience is the condition which makes possible 
all categorical knowledge of individual objects, it follows from the nature of tran-
scendental experience that the analogous statement signifies what is most basic and 
original in our knowledge. Consequently, however familiar equivocal and univocal 
statements are to us from our scientific knowledge and from our everyday dealings 
with the realities of experience, they are deficient modes of that original relation-
ship in which we are related to the term of our transcendence. And this original 
relationship is what we are calling analogy: the tension between a categorical start-
ing point and the incomprehensibility of the holy mystery, namely, God. We our-
selves, as we can put it, exist analogously in and through our being grounded in this 
holy mystery which always surpasses us.43 
So for Rahner too, the grounds for using concepts drawn from our 
language about the realities of our world to talk of God are not properties 
we have in common with God. Nor is analogy itself a univocal concept. Our 
reflexive awareness of our knowing, loving and freedom reveals a kind of 
40
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anticipation or intimation (Vorgriff) of a "whither" that always exceeds our 
grasp. It is the reflexive awareness of this that enables us to speak of that 
incomprehensible "whither," but without thereby grasping or defining it. In 
other words, we can identify the "whither" in terms of our movement, or 
transcendence, toward it in knowing, loving and self-commitment. Thomas 
Sheehan suggests the adjective "kinetic" to describe the movement in-
volved in this "grasping at" or "reaching out" that always falls short of its 
mark.44 In light of this analogous or kinetic identification, we can speak of 
that toward which knowing, freedom, and love move as our "horizon," 
"term," or "goal." In doing so we have not literally described or defined 
God. For all that we truly grasp is ourselves and the openness of our spirit 
outwards beyond ourselves. "Analogical" in this instance means a radically 
indirect and reflexive manner of predication. It presupposes an inherent re-
latedness to God but not anything that could be properly called similarity. 
Since whatever terms we use of God necessarily bear this radically in-
direct and reflexive reference to mystery, the predication is intrinsically 
analogous whether explicit in conspicuously metaphorical terms like 
"whither" and "horizon," or less obvious in terms like "fullness of Truth 
and Love" or "Being Itself." "This means," Rahner argues, "that theologi-
cal statements have a special and peculiar theological relativity of their 
own, i.e. their radical reference to that which infinitely transcends them, 
such that without this reference they become meaningless."45 Accordingly, 
God "can be spoken of only in a qualitatively different kind of state-
ment."46 Like Burrell, he argues with respect to the statement "God is" 
that it "is not a proposition which one can range alongside other proposi-
tions which constitute science" or ordinary language because, as we have 
seen, its logic is of an "utterly different kind."47 Although Rahner is not as 
radical or consistent as Heidegger in distinguishing between what it is "to 
be" as such (Sein) on the one hand and beings "Seienden" or their being-
ness (sometimes rendered as das Seiende, sometimes as Sein or esse), there 
can be no denying that in identifying God with Sein (or esse), he thought 
of both as known only reflexively and indirectly.48 This reflexive knowl-
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 Sheehan argues from this inconsistency for an "atheological" retrieval of Rah-
ner's thought. Saving Rahner's God from Sheehan's critique also ultimately hinges 
on the metaphoric character of Rahner's fundamental metaphysical and theological 
moves. 
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edge, he argues, is not secondary or inferior to our grasp of entities in objective 
concepts, but rather is the necessary condition of possibility for such objecti-
fications—their flip side, as it were—and in a sense more original. 
THE METAPHORIC PROCESS 
Much more would have to be said, if our goal were a comparison of 
BurrelPs inquiries that are mainly philosophical and Rahner's that are 
primarily theological. The difference in the contexts of their writings itself 
suggests a number of questions. There are substantive and methodological 
differences to be sure. The immediate goal here has been a more limited 
one; to show that they, and by implication Johnson, understand analogy 
very differently than Bracken does, and to urge that negotiating the dis-
agreements between Bracken and Johnson requires directly engaging this 
difference. They do not accept Bracken's claim that analogy "requires that 
the entities under comparison have something in common." They question 
the very appropriateness of conceiving God (or "Being") as an entity that 
could be literally one term in a comparison. Bracken does not contest their 
arguments or conception of analogy. He asserts a different one and thus 
begs the question. His claims about how Aquinas or "classical theism" 
understood analogy also beg the question, since the cogency of the position 
of Johnson, Burrell, and Rahner as such does not hinge on whether they 
are accurate historical interpretations of Aquinas. A creative modification 
or even misreading could nevertheless be useful for articulating the 
Church's faith today. Bracken's subsequent arguments against Johnson 
hinge on his assumptions about what is logically compatible with a Thomis-
tic understanding. Since she, Burrell, and Rahner understand the logic of 
analogical signification so differently, unless that issue is engaged it is not 
clear that any of Bracken's criticisms hit their mark. 
Genuine engagement between Bracken and Johnson would require that 
Bracken address these issues. I have not proved that he could not, or that 
those who disagree with him have the better arguments. I have laid out 
some reasons for inquiring about what is at the root of their disagreement. 
I have raised this question about analogy as prelude to a larger objective: 
to characterize Bracken's and Johnson's positions as representing a choice 
between two fundamentally different views of what constitutes religious 
and metaphysical signification. 
At least on the surface of it, the circularity of the positions of Burrell and 
Rahner is somewhat confusing: their explanations of analogy appeal at 
crucial moments to the analogous character of analogy itself. To get a 
better sense of how these arguments about analogy work and the kind of 
signification that is involved, it is helpful to take a hint from Burrell's own 
methodology, to step back from what he and Rahner say about analogous 
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statements, and to examine their performance. What is at the root of this 
shift in meaning that they propose? Mary Gerhart and Allan Melvin Rus-
sell's description of the "metaphoric process" provides a way of clarifying 
this.49 Their proposal summarizes and builds on an extensive body of re-
search in philosophy and literature on metaphor but leads to an innovative 
conception of what metaphor and analogy are and how they come about. 
The immediate context of their discussion is the relationship between sci-
ence and religion. Paul Ricoeur comments that the "most remarkable con-
tribution" of their theory is the proposal that metaphor is the manifestation 
of a fundamental epistemological process underlying the creation of new 
understanding in both disciplines. The decisive step, he notes, is the role 
metaphor plays in changing the fields of meaning in an inquiry. Rather than 
merely augmenting what is already known, metaphor actually creates the 
possibility for new meanings and understanding.50 
The argument presupposes that our inquiries about the world and our-
selves take place in what can be imagined as cognitive spaces or worlds of 
meanings. These worlds of meanings are made up of networks of interre-
lated concepts. Physics, theology, a religion, or common sense as defined 
by a particular time and culture are examples of such fields of meanings. 
The concepts within these fields do not stand directly for things in them-
selves, but for our notions of these things. These notions are defined by 
their interrelation with other notions. For example, to get some conception 
of "house," one must have other notions available (lumber, bricks, tin 
sheets, wall, window, roof, etc.). These other notions are variable, as well 
as the relations between them, so that "meaning, then, arises out of the 
interaction of concepts and relations, and is expressed in the topography of 
the field. Necessary concept changes, such as those which might arise from 
a new experience, alter relations; and changes in relations, such as occur 
when one attempts to understand an experience in a new way, relocate old 
concepts."51 For example, "house" is likely to give rise to a somewhat 
different idea and set of associations for a middle-class North American 
exchange student who has just spent time living in a barrio. Likewise "soul" 
and related notions vary significantly among Christians, Hindus, and Ani-
mists so that despite some similarities between the concepts, it cannot be 
assumed that a Hindu or a Christian share the same notion. Even among 
those who share a world of meanings, the understandings of such notions 
49
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can vary somewhat from person to person, depending on factors such as 
education and linguistic sophistication. Moreover, the meanings can 
change over time if new associations are made between existing notions, or 
if a new notion is added to a field of meanings. For example, in the Gospels 
when Jesus identifies the notion of Messiah with that of the Suffering 
Servant, the association significantly alters not only these notions but, as 
well, a host of other notions related to the idea of eschatological expecta-
tion (a field of meanings), if not the very fabric of Jewish faith (a still 
broader field of meanings).52 
In the view of Gerhart and Russell, a world of meanings is made up of 
collections of such fields of meanings and it "comprises the basis for an 
individual's idea of the way things are."53 The theory regards the individu-
al's or community's construal, when it is successful, as corresponding in a 
genuine but complex way to reality. On the other hand, the theory also 
holds that "worlds of meaning are culture-bound. Within a particular cul-
ture, persons have worlds of meanings that have the same general topog-
raphy despite the fact that a particular field of meanings possessed by one 
person may be completely absent in another."54 What interests Gerhart 
and Russell is how new understandings and meanings develop among 
people who share such a world of meanings. They distinguish the discovery 
of new meanings from the acquisition of new knowledge that involves 
merely an addition of data that does not change the notions or fields of 
meanings themselves. For example, we can learn of new cities or new 
planets and so gain additional information for ourselves or the field of 
astronomy. In doing this, however, we usually do not change the notions of 
"city," "planet," or "solar system." In contrast, Copernicus's insistence that 
the sun is the center of the universe or Newton's insistence that the me-
chanical laws of the heavens are identical with the mechanical laws of the 
earth, created new understandings that changed fundamental notions 
within physics and indeed changed how ordinary people understood things. 
Much of the routine work of scientists and theologians is devoted to the 
former sort of acquisition aimed at expanding the current knowledge base. 
Insights of the latter sort are occurrences of genius and discovery typically 
associated with more extraordinary and consequential developments in a 
52
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field. Analogy, broadly conceived, plays a key role in both processes. A 
crucial element of Gerhart and Russell's proposal is the suggestion that we 
distinguish between three different though related ways of making an 
"analogy" that we can designate as "analogy," "simile," and "metaphor."55 
In Gerhart and Russell's scheme "analogy" and "simile" are conceptual 
tools that often play a key role in the former task, the acquisition of 
additional information. In this context they use "analogy" in a more re-
stricted sense than Burrell and Rahner—closer, in fact, to the notion 
Bracken presupposes. Analogy in this definition involves the use of some 
feature common to a known "x" and a known "y" to extend or expand our 
knowledge of either "x" or "y"—or, in some cases, both. Successful analo-
gies between the operations of the human mind and computers, for ex-
ample, could lead either to a better grasp of how the mind works, to the 
development of more sophisticated software, or to an enriched understand-
ing of both analogues. In my view, Bracken appears to understand his 
modification of the Whiteheadian conception of intersubjectivity as this 
sort of analogy with the Christian notion of God. Such analogies should be 
taken seriously and can be instructive, at least when successful, but, as 
Bracken notes, they do not provide literal descriptions. A computer pro-
gram that simulates thought processes is not actually thinking, nor is it a 
literal map of thinking. A similar caveat would apply to Bracken's analogy 
between intersubjectivity and the trinitarian God of Christian faith. 
Sometimes, only one of the analogues in question will be known. In that 
case, a known feature of "x" tells us something about "y" which is un-
known. This is what Gerhart and Russell understand to be the defining 
characteristic of simile. "So when Max Black wrote, 'The chairman plowed 
through the discussion,' he created a text that instructs the reader who does 
not know how the discussion proceeded, and who now, on the comparative 
basis of the simile, does know," presuming, of course, that both are familiar 
with the use of a plow.56 Whether Black's proposition functions as an 
analogy or simile depends on the knowledge state of the persons involved. 
A person who was present at the chairman's discussion would be in a 
position to agree with Black's analogy or, as we say, to "get" the analogy 
and acquire a deeper insight into the event. That person, however, would 
not be acquiring new information about something unknown. 
Gerhart and Russell note that with these definitions a great many of the 
comparisons we ordinarily think of as metaphors are, in their theory, either 
55
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analogies or similes. The metaphoric process involves a third kind of anal-
ogy where, given the normal understanding of the notions within or be-
tween fields of meaning, there is no acknowledged similarity between a 
known "x" and "y." When such a situation obtains, saying that ux is y" 
forces an analogy between the two knowns that is uncalled for. "In our 
cognitive network, the metaphoric process forces relations in one part of a 
field to be isomorphic with another part, thereby creating a similarity or 
analogy where none existed."57 The distinguishing character of metaphor is 
that it distorts the given world of meanings. Once one gets the point of the 
metaphor—gets the point of affirming that "x is y"—then "x," "y," and the 
coordinates (or field of meanings) in terms of which we had formerly 
understood them, are comprehended in a new way which makes it possible 
to conceive notions, understand relations, and envision as logical what 
could not have been so grasped before the metaphoric act. Gerhart and 
Russell stress that "it is of particular importance to see that it is the theo-
retical structure of the meanings involved in metaphor that makes new 
knowledge possible. The distortion of the fields of meanings by means of 
the metaphoric process is a structural change that demands that other 
meanings and understandings have to be changed in the wake of the meta-
phor."58 They contend that "this is what is so different about the meta-
phoric process. Analogy, on the other hand, is an extension of meaning (as 
distinct from the creation of new meaning). The increased knowledge from 
analogy is primarily in terms of the original understandings."59 
Take the example of the early Christians' affirmation that "Jesus is the 
Messiah."60 Given the images current in the eschatology of the day, af-
firming that God was victorious in the crucified son of a carpenter from 
Nazareth was uncalled for. In fact most of the key eschatological images by 
which Jesus is identified in the Gospels have something of this metaphoric 
dimension. By ordinary logic he was not a victorious King of Israel; he was 
not a Son of Man who descended gloriously from the heavens; he was not 
acknowledged by his people nor did he vanquish their enemies. To affirm 
that Jesus is the Messiah is to force an analogy between him and Israel's 
expressions of hope and trust in God. Forcing the analogy requires us to 
understand differently both Jesus and that hope itself. Affirming that Jesus 
is the Messiah, if taken seriously, forces a thoroughgoing revision of the 
field of meanings operative in Palestinian Judaism, or at least those opera-
tive in the narrative worlds of the New Testament. Given that shift in 
meaning, it is appropriate to say that Jesus literally and properly is the 
57
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Messiah. This is not just a symbolic claim or metaphor. But neither is the 
shift of meaning simply a given. It is a result of a metaphoric forcing of an 
analogy that many non-Christians and historians, among others, do not 
accept. From their perspective it is not true that Jesus is literally the Mes-
siah. Since the metaphoric act creates a shift in meanings, however, it 
would be misleading to focus an inquiry merely on the question of whether 
"Messiah" is used univocally (and so incorrectly) or equivocally (and so to 
no effect) by Jesus' followers. An account that did not take into consider-
ation the logic of this underlying metaphoric process would be inadequate 
for the task. 
According to Gerhart and Russell, Copernicus brought about a similar 
shift in scientific understanding: 
"The sun (not the earth) is the center of the solar system." This is not a simile, nor 
is it an analogy. Furthermore, there is nothing unknown or ambiguous about "the 
sun," nor about "center of the solar system." To insist, on the basis of no obser-
vational evidence, that one of the concepts is the other, conforms to our description 
of the linguistic expression of a metaphoric act. The identity between two hitherto 
different but known concepts changed a host of relations in fields of meanings and 
reformed the topography of the world of meanings. Testimony to the outrageous 
act is amply given in history's descriptions of the reaction of religious authorities.61 
They argue that Newton's equation of the mechanical laws of the heavens 
with the mechanical laws of the earth "had perhaps an even more profound 
effect on our lives"62 and that it was in similar ways metaphoric. 
METAPHORIC SIGNIFICATION IN BURRELL, RAHNER, 
AND JOHNSON 
If one steps back from what Burrell and Rahner say about analogous 
statements and examines the shift in meaning that they propose, it too can 
be explained as a metaphoric act. Both force the analogy between reflexive 
knowing on the one hand and knowledge of objects on the other, insisting 
that the former is the proper model for speaking of God and that it is 
meaningful even though it does not literally grasp God. Burrell, as we have 
noted, calls attention to this reflexivity of knowing by focusing on the 
grammar of asserting as distinct from the grammar of predication. Assert-
ing and predicating are the two knowns. In his analysis, the metaphoric act 
consists in insisting that the former (asserting) provides the grammatical 
analogue for explaining propositions like "John exists" or "God's essence 
is to be 'to be' " even though these look like normal predications (the 
latter). Forcing this analogy opens up space in the available fields of mean-
"The Cognitive Effect of Metaphor" 124. 
Ibid. 
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ings (or Burrell might say, in the available grammar) to speak of an un-
known, God, without thereby getting that unknown directly in our grasp. 
Forcing the analogy does not add God as an object to the scheme of known 
objects nor does it add an objective description of God to our inventory of 
known entities. Forcing the analogy provides us with a different way of 
understanding the relation between what we intend when we use "God" 
and the objects grasped through ordinary predication schemes. It leads to 
a very different understanding of the kind of signification that is entailed 
when we speak of God or esse.63 
While Burrell focuses on the hints of reflexivity implicit in grammar, 
Rahner's more directly metaphysical and epistemological analysis calls at-
tention to the reflexivity implicit in the intentionality of knowing, love, and 
freedom.64 This also fits Gerhart and Russell's conception of a metaphoric 
act. The first known is what Rahner calls "transcendental knowing"—the 
reflexive, indirect and kinetic presence-to-self and anticipation {Vorgriff) 
of the horizon of knowing, love, and freedom. The second known is the 
knowledge of objects or "categorial knowing." Rahner forces an analogy 
by insisting that the model for knowing and speaking of God (or Being 
Itself) is transcendental knowing rather than categorial knowing, and that 
the former is not a derivative, secondary or inferior way of knowing. Forc-
ing the analogy, that is to say speaking of God as "transcendental reality" 
creates a logical space for talking of God even though as Holy Mystery 
God is still beyond our grasp. The logic of God-talk is governed by the 
intrinsic reflexivity and indirectness of this metaphoric signification. This 
must not be forgotten lest one fall into the mistaken notion that transcen-
dental reality is a transcendental "object" that can be known, spoken of or 
described the way we know and speak about categorial objects. Rahner's 
use of terms like "Holy Mystery," "nameless whither," "horizon" and "as-
ymptotic goal" are meant to call attention to this metaphoric shift in sig-
63
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nification. Moreover, characteristic of metaphoric signification, affirming 
that God is transcendental reality effects fundamental and global changes 
in the available theological and metaphysical fields of meanings. 
Likewise, failure to take into account the metaphoric character of this 
sort of analogical predication is bound to distort interpretation of 
Johnson's proposal about providence. An attentive reading indicates that 
she presupposes Rahner's metaphoric insistence that the ground for analo-
gous speech about God is that we ourselves "exist analogously."65 This 
shift in fields of meanings underpins the logic of her argument "that divine 
providence is compatible with genuine randomness and that this compat-
ibility in turn can shed light on the incomprehensible, gracious mystery of 
God."66 Without this fundamental shift in meanings her moves are indeed 
contradictory. I believe the shift also explains her insistence on the impor-
tance of naming God "She Who is," and her resistance both to the sug-
gestion that we merely avoid gendered speech for God or to Bracken's 
recommendation that we use the expression "the Three Who are One."67 
The goal of her effort is not simply to propose a more fitting analogy for 
God or a more apt metaphor (in the sense of mere linguist trope or figu-
rative analogy). Her insistence seeks to force a shift in the theological and 
religious fields of meanings and thus bring to the surface a fuller sense of 
God's mystery, of God's identification with us—female and male—and to 
expose the wounds of sexism in the Church's life and thought. Johnson's 
discussions of analogy and metaphor do not explicitly articulate, as Gerhart 
and Russell do, the underlying transformation in fields of meanings at the 
heart of the metaphoric process involved in this appeal to analogy. Perhaps 
an inattentive reader could even be misled by the lucidity of her explana-
tion of analogy as a threefold motion of affirmation, negation, and emi-
nence. This movement could be (mis)understood as simply an elaboration 
of the sort of analogy that provides an extension of meaning, even if in a 
"supereminent" way, within a given field of understanding but that does 
not create new meanings or the possibility for new understanding as the 
metaphoric process does. Johnson's insistence that "the analogical process 
is a dynamic of relational knowing" accomplished in judgment rather than 
in a concept,68 and her reference to Rahner's understanding of analogy 
later in the chapter, indicates otherwise. However, I suspect that this notion 
of analogy may not be understood clearly or widely enough to preclude the 
possibility of such a misreading.69 
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THE COMPLEXITY OF ANALOGICAL AND 
METAPHORIC SIGNIFICATION 
If we grant Gerhart and Russell's theory, then a distinction must be 
made between two different epistemological processes that use analogies. 
What they refer to as the "analogical act" involves recognition of similari-
ties (analogies) within or between given fields of meanings. When success-
ful the analogical act expands meanings within those fields without distort-
ing the fields. The "metaphoric act" also involves the recognition of simi-
larities, but these similarities are the result of a "disruptive cognitive act" 
that forces an uncalled-for analogy within or between the fields of mean-
ings—a distortion of one or both of these fields in order to achieve the 
required analogy. When this distortion is productive it creates new under-
standings and meanings. This classification, though, is not quite as neat as 
one might wish, since both processes involve analogies. Moreover, al-
though the classification has offered a way of distinguishing the sort of 
analogical relationship that Bracken has in mind from the sort that Burrell, 
Rahner, and Johnson have in mind, applying the distinction requires some 
interpretative effort since none of them makes the distinction themselves. 
Sometimes, for example, Rahner uses "analogous" in the first sense while 
at other times by "analogous" he intends "metaphoric" in Gerhart and 
Russell's sense. 
Things become more complicated when two other factors are taken into 
consideration. First, as a successful metaphoric act gains acceptance and 
begins to effect permanent transformations in a field of meanings, the 
uncalled-for analogy becomes more and more obvious. After a while, it is 
taken for granted. It becomes a "given" in the new but now stabilized field 
of meanings. The metaphor dies or perhaps more accurately is transformed 
into an analogy, simile, or univocal concept. It was a metaphoric act for 
Copernicus to insist the sun is the center of the solar system, or for Newton 
to insist on the identity of heavenly and earthly mechanics. Such insistence 
would not constitute a metaphoric act today. 
That the propositions could be metaphoric for Copernicus and Newton 
but univocal for us suggests the second complication: whether the act ter-
minates in metaphor, analogy, simile, or a univocal concept is determined 
in part by the knowledge state of the person entertaining it. As we saw with 
Black's example of the chairman plowing through a discussion, an analogy 
becomes a simile if the people entertaining the proposition were not at the 
discussion. Likewise, the persons must know both sets of relations for a 
Johnson's reiteration of these points at the CTSA discussion, since his references to 
the doctrine of analogy later that year at the AAR still do not recognize that 
Johnson has proposed a different sort of analogical predication. 
ANALOGY AND METAPHORIC PROCESS 593 
metaphoric proposition to create a distortion in their fields of meanings. If 
they know only one of the two metaphoric elements, the proposition "func-
tions as an analogy, since the unknown element is free to move within the 
field. Such freedom removes the possibility of tension or distortion of the 
field of meanings... ."70 Alternately, if the persons involved have different 
linguistic sensitivities or only appear to share fields of meanings, and be-
cause of different backgrounds or presuppositions understand one or the 
other of the terms differently, then what for one person is a metaphor, for 
a second could be merely an analogy, while a third might take the propo-
sition as univocal. 
That could be the case, for example, with the Christian insistence that 
Jesus is the Messiah. This confession as a metaphor challenges us funda-
mentally to reconfigure our understandings of Jesus, of God's love, and of 
humanity's relation to both. A secular historian could understand the same 
proposition as merely an analogy, perhaps in some ways justified, in other 
ways not. The proposition could also be taken naively as asserting a univ-
ocal identification of Jesus and the Messiah. A historically naive believer 
might affirm the proposition that way, while an unbeliever who also takes 
the assertion as a univocal identification would likely deny it. What those 
two would have in common on this reading is not that both interpret the 
assertion literally, but that both miss its metaphoric character, or at least 
potential. Someone like myself who affirms the metaphoric character of the 
proposition, is not denying its appropriateness to Jesus, but only specifying 
the logic by which it can be said properly and literally of him. The meta-
phoric and literal are not necessarily opposed unless literal and univocal 
are identified. When as a Christian theologian I insist on the metaphoric 
character of the claim that Jesus is my Lord and Messiah, it is not to say 
less—certainly not to deny he is the Messiah—but to open up a field of 
meanings that enables us to say more. 
Gerhart and Russell conclude from these kinds of considerations that, if 
metaphor and analogy are viewed as cognitive processes, "reception" has 
to be taken into account to understand what is being signified. Although 
Bracken does not ignore the historical and conceptual contexts of his in-
terlocutors, it appears that in his view of analogy it is possible to talk about 
what a given idea of God logically demands without taking into consider-
ation how the significance or logical entailments of that idea might be 
qualified by fundamental shifts of understanding in the theoretical horizons 
of meaning in which the idea is proposed or in the personal horizons of 
those entertaining the idea. Noting the importance of "reception" in the 
metaphoric process does not enjoin the kind of metaphysical and theologi-
cal engagement Bracken seeks between process thought and other per-
"The Cognitive Effect of Metaphor" 121. 
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spectives. Nor does this position undermine logical or metaphysical rigor. 
Rather my position speaks to the care that must be taken in such com-
parative analysis and suggests something of the complexity involved in 
comparing the logic of different metaphysical conceptualizations. It speaks 
to the need for a theory of metaphysical and theological signification that 
can account for this sort of complexity. Finally, it speaks to the importance 
of clarifying how it is that language and thinking signify God in the first 
place. Fundamental disagreement about that is likely to preclude, or at 
least confuse, meaningful dialogue on other issues. 
THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF ENTITATIVE ANALOGIES 
Bracken had characterized the difference between Johnson's position 
and his as the choice between a worldview governed by the logic of objec-
tive cause-effect relationships and one governed by the logic of intersub-
jectivity. The point of my analysis has been to show that the difference 
would be described more fundamentally and accurately as the choice be-
tween a worldview governed by the assumption that metaphoric significa-
tion provides the only proper logic for speaking and thinking of the mys-
tery of God and a worldview governed by the logic of entitative analogies. 
The first worldview, as we have seen, holds that the only way to speak of 
God, or being-as-such (esse, Sein) for that matter, is by stretching language 
to the limits. The analogies that result from such metaphoric thinking do 
not grasp the reality as such, but nevertheless by a twist of thought, reflex-
ively and indirectly point to what is in question. As Rahner's works dem-
onstrate, the metaphoric character of these analogies does not preclude the 
possibility of rigorous and robust "metaphysical" argumentation even 
though being-as-such always remains beyond the grasp of human concepts. 
But attention to this argumentation's distinctive transcendental logic is 
crucial to correctly understanding it. This worldview, for both philosophical 
and theological reasons, holds that God cannot be conceived as an entity in 
the world or alongside it. To say that "God is," is not to say that God is a 
created being or an entity directly analogous to created beings. Inevitably, 
because of the limits of human knowing and language, we speak as if God 
were an entity or being, but correct interpretation requires that the meta-
phoric character of such talk, and consequently its distinct logic, must 
always be kept in mind. Hence, talk of God as the Supreme Being or the 
identification of God with being-as-such, properly understood, does not 
postulate either being or beingness as a determinable and univocal com-
mon denominator between creature and Creator. There is not that kind of 
direct analogy or isomorphism between creature and Creator or between 
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beings and being-as-such even though the convictions of Christian faith 
lead to a metaphoric insistence on such analogies.71 
Bracken's position appears to stake out a different worldview that holds 
it is possible to make some sort of analogy between God and other entities. 
Although God in this view clearly transcends other entities and is not 
literally observable, Bracken presumes that creature and Creator must 
have something univocal and identifiable in common, because the principle 
of analogy requires it.72 It would be inaccurate to say that his worldview 
lacks any metaphoric dimension at all. Although we have given little at-
tention to it here, there can be no question that a fundamental shift in fields 
of meanings is proposed in process philosophy's affirmation "that being is 
an activity rather than an entity." That this perspective initially seems so 
counter intuitive yet, on further reflection, so suggestive is an obvious 
indication of a creative disruption in our fields of meanings. The two 
knowns are "beings" and the "activity which beings instantiate" (or sub-
stance and process). The world does indeed look different, and a new 
metaphysics is possible, if we take seriously this insistence that being is an 
activity. But the field of meanings is still a metaphysics concerned with 
entities and the activity common to entities. The field of meanings is still 
what Thomas Sheehan calls "ousiology," the beingness of beings. Process 
theology does not open up a new field of meanings in which Being (Sein in 
Heidegger's sense or esse in BurrelPs and Rahner's, if not Aquinas's sense) 
can be thought of as different from beings (Seiende) or from the beingness 
of beings (die Seiendheit des Seienden). That is to say, the analogy is still 
with finite beings whether the underlying model of being is entities or the 
activity that entities instantiate, whether substance or process, whether 
beings or beingness. I do not think there is any question that Heidegger 
would have objected that this conception of "process" remains at the level 
of onto-theo-logy, because its concern is still with general ontology: with 
the beingness of beings not with the prior sense of Being (Sinn des Seins), 
and with a God conceived as the entity who is the primary instantiation of 
being(ness) so conceived.73 Heidegger proposed that thinking Being and 
God requires a more fundamental kind of thinking. A "beetle-browed 
71
 This of course implies a non-foundationalist reading of Rahner's and Burrell's 
arguments but again it is beyond the purview of this article to demonstrate that. 
Burrell provides his own argument in "Religious Belief and Rationality," in Ratio-
nality and Religious Belief, ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame, 1979). 
72
 The Divine Matrix 37. 
73
 I believe Bracken's effort to appropriate Heidegger's thought in the third 
chapter of The Divine Matrix suffers from the same kind of misreading of meta-
phoric signification that we have seen in his interpretation of contemporary Tho-
mists. Heidegger's thought from beginning to end focused on the intrinsic elusive-
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Heideggerian" would suspect that Rahner is also guilty of a "forgetfulness" 
of this ontological difference.74 A Rahnerian nevertheless would still object 
that Bracken's conception of being, and surely his conception of an enti-
tative reality of God distinguishable from the divine nature or being(ness) 
that it instantiates, proposes an ontic (categorial) model that is inappro-
priate for an ontological (transcendental) reality. Rahner, Burrell, and 
Johnson would insist that esse and God require a different kind of signifi-
cation. Bracken's worldview uses a metaphor to reconceive God and be-
ing(ness) but not to reconceive the thinking of God and being-as-such. 
From the point of view staked out in the first worldview, that sort of 
entitative analogy and logic could never do justice to the elusiveness of 
being-as-such or the transcendence and mystery of God. 
Bracken's remarks about his own interpretation of Aquinas apply to my 
interpretation of his discussion with Johnson. "Naturally, these arguments 
between the adherents of rival schools of thought about their respective 
strengths and weaknesses are never conclusive. Further arguments can 
always be adduced from both sides either to bolster one's own position or 
to expose the weakness of the other side."75 If he is to get the other side's 
attention, however, he will have to address their convictions about how we 
know and speak of God. If conversations between these two world views 
are to contribute to a more general theological consensus about the doc-
trine of God or to academic and pastoral dialogues between religion and 
science, then, at minimum, greater clarity is required about their respective 
understandings of the logic of metaphoric and analogical signification. The 
aim here has been to lay the groundwork for that sort of clarification. 
ness of Being (Sein). Bracken's identification of Heidegger's Being with the activity 
or process that beings instantiate and his suggestion that this is what Heidegger 
meant by insisting that Being is No-thing belies the overwhelming thrust of Heideg-
ger scholarship that sees that very line of interpretation precluded by Heidegger's 
unremitting efforts to clarify first that the "Being question" is not about Being but 
about the difference between beings and Being, and then that it is about the 
difference-as-such, and then about event of truth, and so forth. Bracken's refer-
ences to William Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967) has something of the same irony as his citation 
of Burrell, since I understand Richardson to be arguing that the key to understand-
ing what Heidegger means by Being is to follow how Heidegger displays the relation 
between thinking and Being that strictly speaking always remains the "unthought." 
74
 The phrase is William Richardson's in an essay asserting this about Lonergan 
("Being for Lonergan: A Heideggerian View," in Language, Truth and Meaning, 
ed. Philip McShane [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1972] 272-78, at 277). 
The contention that this was true of Rahner was the thrust of my article written as 
a student of Richardson ("Rahner and Heidegger: Being, Hearing and God," The 
Thomist 37 [1973] 455-88). It is also central to Sheehan's argument. 
75
 The Divine Matrix 28. 
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